Private hospitals: will they be there
for you – or not?
The system is broken. Hospitals are closing, patients turned away. It doesn’t have to be this way.
Australians are fast losing faith in public hospitals. After
witnessing decades of decline, scandals, under-funding, overcrowding and
ambulance ramping, it’s hardly surprising.
Those with the means to do so are looking for alternatives,
and finding them – or believing they are finding them – in the private system.
But, if public hospitals won’t be there for them, private hospitals might not
be either. Both are in serious trouble.
The best single measure of the stress on the nation’s public
hospitals is the time people needing admission to a ward are kept in emergency
departments because there are no beds available for them. This chart shows the
figure at the 90th percentile: that is, the time by which 90% have
been admitted and 10% are still waiting.
As a result, the long-term decline in insurance fund
membership has dramatically reversed. The low point was in 2018, when 64,700
more people dropped coverage than took it up. But in 2024, the increase reached
309,000 – almost double the 20-year average.
Glitches in
the system
GLITCH: Australia still claims to have a universal
healthcare system, one which treats you on the basis of need, not on your
ability to pay. But unless you can pay – and pay quite heavily – this fallback
option is closed to you, forcing you back into the inadequate and increasingly
chaotic public system. A top hospital-only policy with Medibank Private for a
family will cost almost $6,000 a year, even with a $750 excess on every claim
made.
GLITCH: Private hospitals do not provide the same services
as the public system. The private system concentrates strongly on elective
surgery, which is more profitable than medical services. If you’re an emergency
case – particularly if you’re a road trauma patient – you will almost certainly
be treated in a public hospital.
As this chart shows, the split is striking.
GLITCH: The funding system allows private hospitals to boost
profits by cherry-picking patients. It’s a very long-standing problem and it’s
been getting much worse lately.
GLITCH: Doctors, not patients, are the customers in private
hospitals. Doctors who are unhappy with a private hospital are likely to move
to somewhere else and take their patients with them. Doctors bill their
patients, not the hospital. There is therefore no effective countervailing
pricing power: they can charge whatever they think their market can stand. Some
doctors, particularly surgeons and anaesthetists, earn several million dollars
a year.
GLITCH: Health insurance companies can protect their
profits, as can doctors. Hospitals have far fewer options, leading to many
distortions that are not in the interests of patients or the nation.
GLITCH: Many hospitals are losing money and closing. Some
new hospitals are opening, but have a different, more restricted and more
profitable patient mix and are likely to have fewer beds.
The big squeeze
Private hospital operating costs have been rising significantly faster than revenue. For the six years to 2022-23, average costs have risen by 3.2% a year but revenue by only 1.8%.
The gap between per-patient costs and revenue was a healthy
8.7% in 2017-18 but only 1.5% five years later. These industry-wide averages
conceal a wide range, from patients who make good money for the hospital, to
those who break even, and to those who lose money for the hospital. Managers
have a clear and increasing incentive to cherry-pick.
Meanwhile, insurance companies are covering a progressively
lower proportion of actual hospital revenue and costs.
By 2023-24, industry-wide operating profits before tax had
shrunk from 16.7% before the pandemic to 2.8% in 2023-24. The long-term trend
is unmistakable.
The pandemic hit
private hospital revenues badly. Governments restricted activity in private
hospitals and in some cases commandeered wards and operating theatres. And
during lockdowns, far fewer patients sought treatment.
As pandemic restrictions strangled world trade, supply
pipelines for hospital equipment and resources dried up and costs soared. The
war in Ukraine added to the problems. And those costs remained high.
As we’ve seen, private health insurers provide less than
half of private hospital funding. Data from the Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare show that the federal government provided 37% of recurrent costs of
public hospitals in 2022-23 and almost the same – 36% -- for private hospitals.
The AIHW figures ascribe the premium rebate, which in that
year cost $3.3 billion, to the Commonwealth and not to the insurers. The
government also contributed through the Department of Veterans Affairs ($648
million) and through Medicare and the PBS ($3.7 billion).
Individual patients paid out-of-pocket costs amounting to
11% of total private hospital revenue.
The insurers, in contrast to the hospitals, are doing very
nicely.
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Medibank Private's luxurious new headquarters |
Out of that come lavish management fees. These include very high remuneration for senior executives. The boss of Medibank was paid $4.5 million in 2023-24 and the head of the much smaller NIB got $3.7 million (though he did better in the previous year, with $4.3 million).
The annual reports of most large Australian companies reveal
what they pay their top executives. That is not the case with BUPA and HCF,
which together control 39% of the national market. BUPA is not a listed company
but a wholly-owned subsidiary of a top British insurer. HCF is listed but
employs an unusual format in its reports, which keeps individual remuneration
secret.
On the basis of fund size and performance, it is unlikely
that BUPA’s boss, Nicholas Stone, earns less than $5 million or that the HCF
CEO, Sheena Jack, gets less than $4 million.
Distortions
Private hospitals dominate in the key elective surgery
category, defined as any procedure which can be scheduled. In practice, this
means anything that can be delayed for 24 hours or more.
Private hospitals in Tasmania and the territories refuse to provide their data to national agencies, so figures exist only for the five larger jurisdictions.
Access to elective surgery is centrally important.
Procedures range from the minor (cataracts, wart removals) to the critical
(coronary artery bypass grafts, heart valve replacements, cancer treatment).
Unless you are one of the relatively small number of public hospital patients
who are operated on in private hospitals with the state government paying, you
will have to pay. If you have to rely on the public system, you may have to
wait for many months or even years. Too many people needing treatment, but who
can’t afford to pay for it, will never get their operations.
The current situation represents a major failing of this
country’s public system. Because of this, Australia is significantly more
unfair than it should or could be.
Ten years ago, the gap between public and private was much
less. Over the past decade, the number of people receiving elective surgery in
public hospitals has been steady, despite ever-increasing demand. Private
hospital treatment has continued to rise.
Here’s another view of the same thing. In 2013-14, private
hospitals treated 696,000 more elective surgery patients than the public
system. With the pandemic, that figure shot up to over 900,000 and has remained
elevated.
Public hospitals, under-funded for far too long, can no
longer cope.
Private hospitals leave emergency surgery to the public
system. Elective earns much more money with much less financial risk.
In both public and private systems, there has been a race to
improve efficiency, treating more patients with the same inputs of staff and
resources. Public hospitals discharge people much more quickly than was once
the case; but that trend can’t go on forever, and it ended in around 2016.
Since then, public per-patient costs have soared as hospitals become less and
less efficient.
In the private system, the drive for lower costs is driven
by the funding squeeze. Patients who can be treated and discharged in a single
day are preferred to those who must be in hospital for several days. This chart
shows the trend in private hospitals: a decade ago, there were 2.1 same-day
patients for every overnight patient. By 2024, that ratio had risen to 2.6.
Less profitable patients are being sacrificed in the quest
for income. Expectant mothers are less profitable, and private birthing
services have closed
down in around 30 locations around the country. The most recent are in
Hobart and Darwin, both run by the troubled Healthscope network.
“These closures are the latest in a long list of private hospitals
that have closed or downgraded their services in critical areas such as
maternity care, mental health and reconstructive surgery,” said the Australian
Medical Association in a release.
“’The importance of maternity services simply cannot be
overstated, and those who purchase private health insurance deserve to do so
with the confidence they will get the care they need,’ Dr McMullen said.”
Mental health treatment is suffering a similar fate. Public
facilities are unable to cope with rising demand, and – as this chart shows –
numbers have been flat for almost a decade. Much of that slack had been taken
up by the private system until the recent downturn began. Since 2022-23, when
these data end, the trend has accelerated.
Here’s what they’re actually doing. Of the top ten
categories, eight are elective surgery. Both the others (for sleep apnoea and
vaginal delivery) are relatively cheap services. The others are much more
expensive, earning more money for the doctors and the hospitals.
What can be
done?
It’s almost all about money: how much, who pays and – most
critically – the way that money is distributed.
As a nation, we spend plenty on private hospitals. In
2022-23 it amounted to $21.5 billion and the annual growth rate – even after
being adjusted for inflation – was 3.9% over the past decade. It ought to be
enough. And it would be – if we spent it more intelligently.
There is ample evidence of a massive imbalance between
insurers and hospitals. The hospitals are short of money and the insurers are
rolling in it.
INDEXATION: The hospitals suggest
that payouts from insurers to hospital operators should be indexed, to take
account of overall rising costs. That would help hospital bottom lines, but it
would still allow them to cherry-pick patients, getting rid of the less
profitable services and boosting the money-making ones. Good for business, less
good for customers.
ACTIVITY-BASED FUNDING: The method the federal government
uses to fund public hospitals would be more effective and fairer. But it’s more
complicated than it looks.
The government sets the payment for each service according
to its average real-world cost. To do this, the huge variety of services are
broken down into a list of categories, called diagnosis related groups. The
table at the end of the last section shows ten of these.
Each DRG is assigned a weighting figure. A knee replacement
(minor complexity) has a weighting of 3.6, and a caesarean delivery is 1.9.
Sleep apnoea is only 0.2.
Those cost-weights refer to a single dollar figure, called
the National Efficient Price. For public hospitals, a cost-weight of 1 gets $7,258.
Therefore, that knee replacement would be worth $26,129, a caesarean $13,744
and sleep apnoea treatment $1,557.
A similar method could be used for private hospitals too –
but it would take a lot of work and would be far less effective than it might
look.
In public hospitals, this system can account for all costs
because the government employs the doctors. In private hospitals, doctors bill
their patients and would therefore fall outside any pricing mechanism. There
would still be no effective countervailing force to limit their extraordinary
pricing power.
Only two-thirds of private hospitals report data to the
government’s Independent Health and Aged Care Pricing Authority. The authority
is under-resourced for the work it already does, and adding another huge layer
would require more funding and a lot more expert employees.
DIRECT FUNDING: Labor went to the 2004 election with a
policy of paying private hospitals directly to supply services to a range of
public patients. That was the election famously lost by Mark Latham, and the
policy has not been seen since.
That’s a pity. If such a scheme was introduced on a large
scale, it would give the hospitals an alternative funding source, making them
less reliant on the inefficient and unreliable private insurers. Critically,
the government would sign contracts with the hospital operators for all
elements of treatment costs, including payments to surgeons, anaesthetists and
other private-practice doctors. At last, they would face significant countervailing
power.
Funding could use the same activity-based funding model,
currently used in the public system.
This would be opposed by doctors, their lobby groups, and
health insurers, for obvious reasons. And it would cost a lot of money.
On the other hand, the federal government already finances
private hospital services to the tune of almost $8 billion, with $9.7 billion
coming from the insurers. And some state governments already buy some private services
for public patients.
Money from government would replace money from the private
insurers. And – given the added efficiency inherent in government funding – extra
public funding of $9 billion a year would make the government the
overwhelmingly dominant funder of private hospital services. To put that into
context, that’s 28% of the money the federal government spends on public
hospitals, 9% of its total health budget and 1.2% of its overall budget.
The premium rebate, currently costing almost $8 billion a
year, would be removed from insurers and the money used to pay hospitals
directly. The insurers would retain a role in the new system, but not the
central one, covering those non-core services that the publicly-funded scheme
did not.
Because private insurance payouts would be so much less,
premiums would fall dramatically, despite the government subsidy no longer being
available. In order to remain competitive in the new environment, insurers would
have a strong incentive to sign contracts with hospitals for an entire service
package which would include doctors’ fees.
But the money would have to come from somewhere. Taxation would
have to increase.
If new tax revenue was drawn from the capital, rather than
the labour, share of the economy, the social wage would increase materially and
inequality would be reduced. The obvious candidate is the 50% discount on
capital gain tax for individuals and trusts, introduced in 1999 by Howard and
Costello.
The Treasury estimates that this
will cost the budget $14.3 billion in 2025-26 and $16.5 billion by 2027-28.
Halving the discount rate from 50% to 25% would pay for almost all the cost of this
hospital reform proposal.
The present tax discount policy discriminates massively
against 90% of taxpayers and favours only the top 10%. The richer you are, the
more this measure gives you. The richest 10% gets around 82% of the benefit.
This is important, socially and economically. Australia has
an inequality problem..
Since 1975, the share of national income going to the
richest 10% of the population increased from 25% to 33%; the bottom half went
the other way, from 20% to 17%.
The introduction of Medicare by the Hawke-Keating Labor
government in 1984 made a major contribution to the social wage: people no
longer had to spend on private health services – or to miss out on care they
could not afford. Medicare allowed the government and the union movement to end
the wage-price spiral and end a long period of damaging inflation and
industrial conflict. Medicare is now firmly embedded in Australian society.
But it is not enough. As we have seen, private hospitals are
an indispensable element of the health system. Reforming them and making them
fit for purpose would represent an advance almost as great as Medicare 41 years
ago.
It can be done. All that’s missing is political will.